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When a private promise to pay in the future is generally accepted as a means of payment
within an economy, we have a single nancial asset that ts the denitions of both credit and
money. The most common example of such an asset in the modern US economy is a merchants
credit account with a credit card company. The asset is both a privately issued liability and a
liability that is almost universally accepted in payment. How can an asset have both of these
attributes simultaneously? The essential link between them is this: the private issuer is widely
viewed as almost default free. Very little time is spent by merchants worrying about what to do in
case Visa, MasterCard or American Express fails to meet its obligations.
This paper uses the assumption that nancial intermediaries are default-free to set up a perfect
world where intermediation can e¤ortlessly overcome the monetary problem created by the friction
in our model. In fact, our perfect world is in many ways a replica of the competitive model with one
important distinction: the role of nancial intermediaries and their most important characteristic
have been dened. Just as the competitive model posits the existence of an ideal real world in
order to articulate the nature of economic relations between agents, we hope that by positing the
existence of an ideal nancial world we can articulate the role that nancial institutions play in the
real economy.
The assumption that nancial intermediaries are default-free means that their liabilities are
accepted as a means of payment, and this is essential to the economys ability to reach the rst-
best. This assumption can be motivated by the work of Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999b), which
demonstrates that bankers with public histories choose not to default in equilibrium. Clearly, we
take this assumption as a starting point and recognize that a full understanding of the nature of
nancial intermediation will require a careful study of the e¤ects of relaxing our assumptions.
Section 1 of the paper introduces the model. The model is based on a standard innite horizon
general equilibrium endowment economy with one change: the general equilibrium assumption
that every agent can buy and sell goods simultaneously is relaxed. In every period of our model
each agent is randomly required to either sell rst and then make purchases or to buy rst and then
sell his product. In section 1 we solve for the set of Pareto optimal allocations and the stationary
competitive equilibria of the model. In section 2 we assume that debt is not enforceable and
introduce at money. Now the trading friction implies that each consumer will with probability
one half face an endogenous cash-in-advance constraint. We nd that implementation of an
e¢ cient allocation using at money is possible only if the government can collect type-specic
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taxes. In section 3 of the paper we consider an alternative monetary regime based on default-free
intermediaries and nd that a rst-best can be attained by a debt contract that is uniform across
agents, if our consumers are su¢ ciently patient. Section 4 concludes.
1 The Model
The time horizon is innite, and each period is divided into two sub-periods. There are n goods
indexed by j 2 f1; :::; ng, and these goods perish in each sub-period. The continuum of innitely
lived consumers has unit mass. In every period each consumer is endowed with a quantity, y, of one
good where y 2 f1; :::; kg, and the endowment may arrive in the rst or in the second sub-period.
Let i 2 I  f1; :::; ng  f1; :::; kg index the di¤erent types of agents. Assume that each type of
consumer, i, has mass 1nk .
In each period consumers value consumption in either sub-period one or sub-period two, but
never in both sub-periods. When consumption is valued, every consumers preferences are given
by the period utility function,
U(c) =
nX
j=1
u (cj)
where cj is the agents consumption of good j. The underlying utility function, u(c) is continuously
di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly concave. We assume that u(0) is a nite number. Every
consumer chooses consumption to maximize the expected sum of his discounted utility. As there
is no discounting from one sub-period to the next, we can represent each consumers objective
function as:
E0
1X
t=0
tU(ct) (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and ct is the agents consumption vector at date t.
With probability one half each agent will receive a rst sub-period endowment and a utility
shock such that consumption is only valued in the second sub-period and with probability one-half
the agent will receive a second sub-period endowment and a utility shock such that consumption is
only valued in the rst sub-period. The probability distribution driving this process is non-atomic
and i.i.d. Clearly the rst group of agents sells their endowments in the rst sub-period and
purchases their consumption set in the second, while the second group of agents purchases and
consumes in the rst sub-period and sells their endowments in the second. We will call the rst
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group rst sub-period sellers and the second group rst sub-period buyers. Let Y be the aggregate
endowment of each good in each sub-period, or Y = 12nk
Pk
y=1 y.
The Pareto optimal allocations of this environment are given by the solution to the social
planners problem.1 Let i be the weight placed by a planner on each type i. Then the planners
problem is:
max
cijt
nX
i=1
i
1X
t=0
t
nX
j=1
u
 
cijt

(2)
subject to a resource constraint in every sub-period:
Y =
1
2nk
nX
i=1
cijt
We dene the solution to the planners problem in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The set of Pareto optimal allocations has the following properties:
(i) cijt = c
i for all j; t and
(ii) iu0(ci) = i
0
u0(ci0) for all i; i0 2 I.
Once the agents have been divided into rst sub-period buyers and sellers at date t, each agent
has a role in the goods market: t 2 fB;Sg where B represents a rst sub-period buyer and S
a rst sub-period seller. This uncertainty is realized at the start of each period and generates a
history for each agent, f0; 1; :::g. Let Ht be the set of possible histories at t and let an individual
agents history be represented by ht 2 Ht. ft(i; ht) is the mass at date t of agents of type i with
history, ht. Observe that ft(i; ht) = 1nk
1
2
t+1
is independent of both type and history. In this
environment all of a consumers choice variables can depend both on the consumers type and on
the consumers history of being a rst sub-period buyer or seller.
1.1 The Enforceable Debt Solution
First we will nd the competitive solution to this model by introducing privately issued bonds into
the environment. An implicit assumption underlying standard competitive models is that private
debt is perfectly enforceable, and this is the assumption we make in this section of the paper.
We will use bist(ht 1; t) to represent the bond holdings at date t of an agent of type i; history
ht 1 and market role t at the start of sub-period s 2 f1; 2g. The price of good j in sub-period
1 In the terminology of the mechanism design literature, these are the ex ante Pareto optima or the optimal
allocations that are chosen before the uncertainty in our model is realized.
4
one of date t is given by pjt, and the price of a similar good in sub-period two by qjt. Then the
rst and second sub-period budget constraints for an agent of type i = fj0; yg with market role B
are:
bi2t(ht 1; B) = (1 + it)b
i
1t(ht 1) 
nX
j=1
pjtc
i
jt(ht 1; B) (3a)
bi1t+1(ht 1; B) = (1 + rt)b
i
2t(ht 1; B) + qj0ty (3b)
where it is the interest rate paid on a bond held from sub-period 2 of date t  1 to sub-period 1 of
date t and rt is the interest paid on a bond held from sub-period 1 to sub-period 2 of date t. For
an agent of type i = fj0; yg with market role S the budget constraints are:
bi2t(ht 1; S) = (1 + it)b
i
1t(ht 1) + pj0ty (3c)
bi1t+1(ht 1; S) = (1 + rt)b
i
2t(ht 1; S) 
nX
j=1
qjtc
i
jt(ht 1; S) (3d)
Because each agent chooses consumption and bond holdings after learning whether his market
type is B or S in the current period, our statement of the consumers objective function must take
this fact into account. As there is no uncertainty in the current period, at date t each consumer of
type i chooses cijt and b
i
st to maximize the following objective function:
t
nX
j=1
u
 
cijt(ht)

+ Et
1X
s=t+1
s
0@1
2
nX
j=1
u
 
cijs(hs 1; B)

+
1
2
nX
j=1
u
 
cijs(hs 1; S)
1A (4)
subject to the budget constraints, equations 3a, 3b, 3c and 3d and taking the initial endowment
vector of bonds, (1 + i0)bi10(h 1)  bi0, as given. We will call this the enforceable debt problem.
Finally, the goods market will have to clear:
Y =
X
i2I
X
hs2Ht 1
cijt(hs; t)ft(i; hs; t) for all j; ; t (5)
Observe that this condition is a market-clearing condition for each sub-period of date t because it
holds for t 2 fB;Sg.
Denition 1 An enforceable debt equilibrium is an allocation for each type and each possible
history of goods, fcijt(ht)g; and of bonds, fbist(ht)g; and sequences of prices, fpjtg and fqjtg; and of
interest rates, frtg and fitg, such that
(i) given prices and interest rates, the enforceable debt problem is solved for each type i and history,
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ht, and
(ii) markets clear
(a) in each sub-period of the goods market, equation 5, and
(b) in the bond market: 0 =
Pn
i=1 b
i
st(ht)8s; t.
Denition 2 A stationary enforceable debt equilibrium is an enforceable debt equilibrium in
which cijt(ht) = c
i
j for all i; j; t; ht.
Using ist(ht 1) as the Lagrangian multiplier on the budget constraint for an agent of type i,
history ht 1, and market role S in sub-period s at date t and ist(ht 1) for a similar agent with
market role B, we nd the following rst-order conditions for the enforceable debt problem:
tu0

cijt(ht 1; B)

pjt
 i1t(ht 1)8j; t
tu0

cijt(ht 1; S)

qjt
 i2t(ht 1)8j; t (6a,b)
(1 + rt)
i
2t(ht 1) = 
i
1t(ht 1) (1 + rt)
i
2t(ht 1) = 
i
1t(ht 1) (6c,d)
1 + it+1
2
 
i1t+1(ht 1; S) + 
i
1t+1(ht 1; S)

= i2t(ht 1) (6e)
1 + it+1
2
 
i1t+1(ht 1; B) + 
i
1t+1(ht 1; B)

= i2t(ht 1) (6f)
Note that the last four equations hold with equality because there is no non-negativity constraint
on nancial assets, so all choices of bond-holdings are interior solutions.
Before demonstrating that every stationary enforceable debt equilibrium is Pareto optimal, in
lemmas 1 and 2 we will characterize prices and consumption in enforceable debt equilibria.
Lemma 1 In any enforceable debt equilibrium at every date t, any pair of goods has the same price
in sub-period one: pjt = pt for all j and t, and in sub-period two: qjt = qt for all j and t
Lemma 2 In any enforceable debt equilibrium at any date t, every agent of type i and history, ht,
consumes the same quantity of every good j: cijt(ht) = c
i
t(ht) for all i; j; t; ht.
Because our environment is symmetric in goods and agents, we nd that in any sub-period s
and at any date t, market clearing prices are the same for all goods and in equilibrium every agent
chooses to consume the same quantity of every good. Thus symmetry simplies our environment
dramatically.
In lemma 3 we dene equilibrium interest rates in a stationary enforceable debt equilibrium.
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Lemma 3 In a stationary enforceable debt equilibrium, the real interest rate at any date t from
sub-period one to sub-period two is zero, (1 + rt)
pt
qt
= 1 for all t, and the real interest rate from
date t to date t+ 1 compensates the lender for the time value of money, (1 + it+1)
qt
pt+1
= 1 for all
t.
Because the consumption of buyers and sellers is the same in a stationary enforceable debt
equilibrium, it must be the case that the within period real interest rate does not favor buyers or
sellers. Thus in a stationary equilibrium (1 + rt)
pt
qt
= 1.
In lemma 4 we nd that the only stationary level of consumption for an agent of type i that is
consistent with the transversality condition is determined by the agents initial asset position.
Lemma 4 In a stationary enforceable debt equilibrium, the real savings of an agent of type i at
each date t, is determined by bi0:
ci =
1
n

y + (1  ) b
i
0
p0

for all i
Proof. By lemmas 1 and 2, when cijt(ht) = c
i
j for all j; t; ht, then c
i
j = c
i for all i; j. Rearranging
the budget constraints for sub-periods one and two (and dropping the notation for histories as the
equation is the same for buyers and for sellers), we nd:
1
qt

bi1t+1   (1 + rt) (1 + it)bi1t

= y   nci  i
Iterating we nd:
bi1t+1 = 
iqt
tX
s=0
1
s
+
1
t
qt
p0
bi0
The transversality condition for our problem is:
lim
t!1
tu0
 
ci

qt
bi1t+1 = 0 for all i
Imposing the transversality condition on our expression for bonds we nd:
u0
 
ci
  i
1   +
bi0
p0

= 0 for all i
Since u0(ci) is strictly greater than zero, the transversality condition holds if and only if:
bi0
p0
=
 1
1  
 
y   nci for all i
7
Now that we have characterized consumption, prices and interest rates in a stationary enforce-
able debt equilibrium, we can demonstrate that every one of these equilibria is a Pareto optimum.
The initial endowment vector of assets, b0, allows for wealth transfers from one type of agent to
another.
Proposition 2 Every stationary enforceable debt equilibrium is a Pareto optimum. The vector of
intial assets, b0, determines which of the Pareto optima can be reached competitively.
Proof. To show that each stationary enforceable debt equilibrium is a Pareto optimum, we
must rst show that (i) a stationary debt equilibrium exists and then that in equilibrium (ii) cij = c
i
for all i; j, and (iii) there exists a vector of weights, , such that the planners problem is maximized.
Observe that (ii) follows from lemma 2.
To show (i) it is su¢ cient to show that when cijt(ht) = c
i
j for all i; j; t; ht (a) there exist sequences
fbist(ht)g, frtg, fitg, and fpjtg such that the rst order conditions 6a through 6f all hold, and
(b) markets clear. The prices and interest rates consistent with a stationary enforceable debt
equilibrium are found in lemmas 1 and 3.
By lemma 4 we know that:
bi0
p0
=
 1
1  
 
y   nci for all i
As consumption is strictly non-negative, this implies that there is a lower bound on the initial level
of debt:
bi0 
 p0y
1   for all i
The market clearing condition will impose additional constraints on the vectors, ci and bi0 in
equilibrium. First, observe that when calculating market demand, we can sum over the histories
to nd: X
i2I
X
hs2Ht 1
cij0t(hs; t)ft(i; hs; t) =
X
i2I
ci
1
nk
1
2
Then market clearing gives us:
Y =
kX
y=1
y
1
nk
1
2
=
X
i2I
ci
1
nk
1
2
or X
i2I
ci =
kX
y=1
y
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which given the transversality condition is equivalent to:
X
i2I
bi0 = 0
We can conclude that a stationary enforceable debt equilibrium exists whenever the following
conditions hold: (i) pjt = pt for all j and t, (ii) qjt = qt for all j and t, (iii) 1 + it+1 = 1
pt+1
qt
for
all t, (iv) 1 + rt =
qt
pt
for all t, (v) bi0   p0y1  for all i and (vi)
P
i2I b
i
0 = 0. In this equilibrium,
cijt(ht) = c
i = 1n
h
y + (1  ) bi0p0
i
for all i; j; t; ht.
To show (iii), that there exists a vector of weights, , such that planners problem is maximized,
let i
0
= 1. Let {^ = u0(ci0)=u0(c{^) for all {^ 2 I. Then  is a vector with the property that
iu0(ci) = i
0
u0(ci0) for all i; i0 2 I.
When consumption is Pareto optimal, bonds are used to transfer purchasing power from one
sub-period to the next. For example if bi0 = 0 for all i, then there are no transfers of wealth from
one type of agent to the next and bi1t = 0 for all i; t. However, in this case, bonds are still used
between sub-periods to give agents the wherewithal to make purchases: bi2t(ht 1; B) =  pty and
bi2t(ht 1; S) = pty for all i; t; ht 1. In order for a Pareto optimal allocation to be achieved, it must
be the case that the transfer of purchasing power within periods takes place at no cost (that is,
(1 + rt)
pt
qt
= 1). Any other intratemporal interest rate would make sellers better o¤ than buyers
or vice versa.
In this section of the paper we have found the set of Pareto optimal allocations in our envi-
ronment and demonstrated that when debt is enforceable, every stationary equilibrium is a Pareto
optimum. E¤ectively we have demonstrated that when we restrict our interest to stationary
equilibria, the rst welfare theorem holds in our environment.
2 Fiat Money
While perfectly enforceable debt is a solution to the problem of buying and selling at di¤erent
points in time, the assumption of perfect enforceability is very strong. In the absence of an explicit
institutional structure that could make debt enforceable, the more realistic assumption is arguably
that private debt is not enforceable at all. For this reason, it is standard procedure in many areas
of the monetary literature to assume that agents are anonymous: Agents who have defaulted in the
past can not be distinguished from those who have not, and thus default is optimal and borrowing
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is impossible.2 In this section of the paper we assume that agents are anonymous, and therefore
the economy has no bonds.
The means of exchange in this section of the paper is not debt, but at money. In the rst
section of the paper we found that, whether a planner chooses to redistribute wealth or not that
is, whether b0 is a vector of zeros or not the stationary equilibrium of the economy is a Pareto
optimum. We will nd that in the at money environment, a Pareto optimum can only be reached
by a government that treats the di¤erent types of agents di¤erently.
To introduce at money into this environment, assume that each consumer of type i has mi0
units of at money at date 0, and thus the aggregate date 0 money supply is M0 = 1nk
P
i2I m
i
0.
The government controls the money supply by imposing a tax,  it, on each type i paid at the end
of date t  0. So, the aggregate money supply changes as follows: Mt+1 =Mt  1nk
P
i2I 
i
t. The
government burns the proceeds of the tax or, if the tax is negative, costlessly prints at money
to transfer to every consumer.
Denition 3 A government policy is a series of initial money supplies, mi0, and a sequence of
taxes, f itg.
In the rst sub-period the consumers of type B use their money holdings to buy goods and
those of type S sell their endowment for cash. In the second sub-period type B agents sell their
endowment while type S agents use their cash to purchase goods. Let it(ht)  0 be the money
holdings that an agent of type i = fj0; yg and history ht carries at date t from sub-period one to
sub-period two, and mit+1(ht)  0 the money holdings carried by this agent from date t to date
t + 1. Then the budget constraints for the at money problem faced by a rst sub-period sellers
are:
it(ht 1; S) = m
i
t(ht 1) + pj0ty (7a)
mit+1(ht 1; S) = 
i
t(ht 1; S)   it  
nX
j=1
qjtc
i
jt(ht 1; S) (7b)
And for a rst sub-period buyer:
it(ht 1; B) = m
i
t(ht 1) 
nX
j=1
pjtc
i
jt(ht 1; B) (7c)
mit+1(ht 1; B) = 
i
t(ht 1; B)   it + qj0ty (7d)
2Kocherlakota (2002) emphasizes this point.
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Observe that, because money holdings must be non-negative at date t, equation 7c is equivalent to
a cash-in-advance constraint.
The at money problem is for an agent to choose cijt, 
i
t and m
i
t+1 to maximize equation 4
subject to the at money budget constraints, equations 7a, 7b, 7c and 7d.
Denition 4 A at money equilibrium is an allocation for each type and each possible history
of goods fcijt(ht)g and of money, fit(ht)g and fmit(ht 1)g; and sequences of prices, fpjtg and fqjtg,
initial money endowments, fmi0g and taxes, f itg, such that
(i) given the government policy and prices, the at money problem is solved for agents of all types
and histories, and
(ii) markets clear
(a) in the goods market, equation 5, and
(b) in the money market, Mt =
P
i2I
P
ht2Htm
i
t(ht 1)ft(i; ht) for all t.
Once again we use ist(ht 1) as the Lagrangian multiplier on the budget constraint for a rst
sub-period seller of type i and history ht 1 in sub-period s of date t, and ist(ht 1) as the multiplier
for a similar rst sub-period buyer. We nd the following rst-order conditions for an agent of
type i = (j0; y) who is solving the at money problem:
tu0

cijt(ht 1; B)

pjt
 i1t(ht 1)8t
tu0

cijt(ht 1; S)

qjt
 i2t(ht 1)8j; t (8a, 8b)
i2t(ht 1)  i1t(ht 1) i2t(ht 1)  i1t(ht 1) (8c, 8d)
1
2
 
i1t+1(ht 1; S) + 
i
1t+1(ht 1; S)
  i2t(ht 1) (8e)
1
2
 
i1t+1(ht 1; B) + 
i
1t+1(ht 1; B)
  i2t(ht 1) (8f)
Notice that our rst order conditions are similar to those for the enforceable debt problem, except
that we now have non-negativity constraints on all of our choice variables.
As is typical in a cash-in-advance environment, we must also impose the transversality condition
to ensure that over the innite horizon our agents are neither saving assets that they never intend
to spend, nor borrowing money that they never intend to repay.3
lim
t!1 inf 
i
2t(ht 1)m
i
t(ht 1) = 0 for all i; ht
3Cole and Kocherlakota (1998) demonstrate the su¢ ciency of this condition in a standard cash-in-advance envi-
ronment.
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We will study the conditions under which a Pareto optimal equilibrium can be obtained in this
environment. First, we will observe that in a Pareto optimal equilibrium it must be the case that
every agent with consumption, ci > 0 carries su¢ cient money balances at every date t.
Lemma 5 In a Pareto optimal at money equilibrium, at every date t and for every type i money
holdings must equal or exceed the expenditure a rst sub-period buyer requires in order to purchase
the Pareto optimal allocation.
Proof. To reach a Pareto optimal allocation, it must be the case that it(ht 1; B)  0 and
therefore (as is clear from equation 7c) it must be the case that mit(ht 1)  ptnci for all i; t; ht.
This must be true of every consumer, because there is no way of knowing ex ante whether the
consumer will be a rst sub-period buyer or seller in period t.
It is no surprise that we nd that the only prices consistent with the Pareto optima of section
1 are deationary.
Proposition 3 In a Pareto optimal at money equilibrium:
(i) pjt = pt for all j; t
(ii) qjt = qt for all j; t
(iii) qt = pt for all t and
(iv) pt+1 = pt for all t.
Let pt = qt = pjt = qjt for all j; t and pt+1 = pt for all t. Then fpt ; qt g1t=0 represents a
sequence of prices that is in the set of prices consistent with a Pareto optimal allocation. To study
the government policies that implement a Pareto optimal allocation we will take Pareto optimal
prices as given.
In Proposition 4 we demonstrate that any government policy that implements a Pareto optimal
allocation is type specic. The proof is by contradiction. Any uniform government policy will
give every agent the same monetary endowment and the same path of taxation. The transversality
condition will then imply that the real value of every agents savings is the same in every period 
and market clearing will mean that this value must be zero. Thus the only candidate for a Pareto
optimum implemented by uniform government policy is the allocation that does not involve wealth
transfers from one type of agent to another. In this allocation every agent spends the whole value
of his endowment in every period. This in turn means that the each agents end of period money
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holdings change only due to taxation. In other words, given a uniform government policy every
type of agent holds the same quantity of money in every period.
The Pareto optimal allocation without wealth transfers, however, requires that agents with
high endowments consume more than agents with low endowments. Lemma 5 makes it clear
that government policy must give enough money to the wealthy agents to purchase their optimal
consumption bundle. But now we nd that the lower endowment agent will have extra cash in
every period. And it stands to reason, that an optimizing agent with extra cash in every period
will choose to spend some of that extra cash today and thus will not choose the Pareto optimal
allocation. This is the logic behind proposition 4.4
Proposition 4 A Pareto optimal allocation cannot be implemented in a at money equilibrium
equilibrium if the government policy treats all consumers uniformly:
Given a Pareto optimal price sequence, fpt ; qt g1t=0, if mi0 = m0 and  it =  t for all i and t, then
the equilibrium allocation is not a Pareto optimum.
In an environment with an endogenous cash-in-advance constraint we have found that a govern-
ment policy that implements a Pareto optimum must treat agents with low endowments di¤erently
from those with high endowments. Since the requisite di¤erential treatment will give agents an
incentive to misrepresent their endowments, there is reason to doubt that such a government policy
would be successful. As in Sissoko (2007a) where we study a standard cash-in-advance envi-
ronment, we use this fact to motivate the exploration of credit-based money in section 3 of the
paper.
The environment that we have developed here is an extreme case of a Bewley (1980) economy.
Bewley studies stationary equilibria in an economy where endowments and preferences vary accord-
ing to a Markov process. Bewley assumes that sometimes agents have small endowments and a
high marginal utility of consumption, and thus there is a role for money in insuring against idiosyn-
cratic risk. Our model takes these assumptions to the extreme agents always have no endowment
when they value consumption and species a Markov process that facilitates comparison with a
general equilibrium endowment economy without idiosyncratic risk.
Green and Zhou (2005) use a mechanism design approach to study the e¢ ciency of stationary
equilibria in the Bewley environment. Green and Zhou emphasize that money is a mechanism
4Bhattacharya, Haslag and Martin (2005) also nd that type-specic lump-sum taxes implement the rst-best in
several heterogeneous agent environments.
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which uses a single summary statistic the agents money holdings to improve the allocation in
an environment with private information about endowments and preferences. They develop an
example in which a mechanism that combines voluntary giving with a future bonus for past giving
dominates all at money mechanisms. Thus, they demonstrate that when a formal mechanism
design approach to money is taken, a mechanism comparable to borrowing and lending can be
superior to at money. In the next section of the paper we propose a specic institutional framework
that can serve as a starting point for analyzing the monetary role of credit.
3 Default Free Intermediaries
In this section of the paper, we consider a di¤erent form of money. Here claims drawn on private
nancial intermediaries take the place of at money. The exploration of the coexistence of at
money and intermediated money will be left to future work. Because our nancial intermediaries
provide liquidity to the economy, we will often call them banks.
In this paper we will make explicit an assumption underlying much of the literature that studies
the circulation of private liabilities issued by intermediaries: Our intermediaries are default free.
While this assumption may seem strong, papers on the circulation of private liabilities typically
focus on the incentive problem faced by individual agents in the economy and not on the incentive
problem of bankers who are in a position to defraud the public. By not modelling the incentive
problem faced by banks, these papers e¤ectively assume that banks are default free. Examples
include Williamson (1999, 2004), Bullard and Smith (2003) and Berentsen, Camera and Waller
(2005).
To our knowledge, only Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a,b) endogenize the problem of the banker
whose liabilities serve as means of exchange. The Cavalcanti and Wallace papers study a random-
matching model of money where bankers are distinguished from non-bankers by the fact that their
histories are public knowledge. They nd that when bankers are su¢ ciently patient, they will honor
their liabilities and make possible a higher level of welfare in the economy.5 We too demonstrate
that intermediaries can improve welfare, but in an environment that is simpler and more easily
compared to a standard general equilibrium model. Furthermore, whereas bankers in Cavalcanti
and Wallace can only issue bank notes, our bankers actively lend to the general public, so the
5Mills (2007) distills the Cavalcanti Wallace model to its essentials and then generalizes it to nd allocations in
which both inside money and at money are essential.
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nature of their activities is di¤erent.
We will show here that when we assume that private institutions are default-free, these in-
stitutions can serve as the infrastructure of a nancial/monetary system, and we argue that this
assumption is a good rst approximation to the environment in a modern developed economy. The
most obvious real world examples of this phenomenon are American Express, Visa and MasterCard
almost all merchants in the United States accept credits in accounts with these nancial inter-
mediaries as payment and almost none buy insurance to protect these accounts in case of default.
According to The 2004 Federal Reserve Payments Study the value of credit card transactions in
the U.S. is currently more than three times the value of ATM withdrawals.
In our model we nd that when these default-free intermediaries o¤er deposit accounts with
credit lines to the consumers in our economy and play a trigger strategy withdrawing credit in
case of consumer default the intermediaries make it possible for the economy to reach a Pareto
optimum. If the consumers in our economy are su¢ ciently patient, a contract that does not
distinguish between types of consumers can be used to reach a Pareto optimum. Because rst
sub-period sellers must accept a bankers liability in exchange for their endowment, this means of
exchange is only possible when sellers have condence in the banking system. This is the sense in
which our equilibrium depends on the assumption that bankers are default free.
In many ways our approach to credit is similar to that of Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2005),
although the underlying model of money is very di¤erent. Banks in both papers do not issue notes,
but instead act as nancial record-keepers for the economy and share information. Consumer debt
is supported by the threat that access to nancial markets will be withdrawn in case of default.
Thus it is no surprise that the results in both papers depend on the level of the discount factor.
The key di¤erence between the two papers is the relationship between nancial transactions and
the goods market. In the Berentsen et al. model at money and credit coexist because agents
have identities in nancial markets, but are anonymous in the goods market thus, debt cannot be
used to purchase goods. In this paper debt is issued in order to purchase goods, and it completely
displaces at money.
We introduce into our model, a competitive banking system that takes deposits and o¤ers loans.
Because the industry is competitive, banks make zero prots and the rate of interest on loans and
on deposits is the same. Thus banks o¤er the consumers in our economy accounts, which when
positive are interest bearing deposits and when negative are credit lines on which interest must
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be paid. Interest payments are credited or charged at the end of every sub-period. Banks share
costlessly veriable information on defaulters, and any agent who fails to pay a debt at date t0 is
shut out of credit markets for all dates t > t0. All accounts start with an initial value of zero.
Let dist(ht) be the value of the account of an agent of type i = fj0; yg and history ht at the start
of sub-period s of date t, let idt be the interest rate paid or charged on accounts from sub-period 2 of
date t  1 to sub-period 1 of date t and rdt be the interest paid on an account held from sub-period
1 to sub-period 2 of date t. Then at date t a rst sub-period buyer and a rst sub-period seller
face the following budget constraints:
di2t(ht 1; B) = (1 + idt)d
i
1t(ht 1) 
nX
j=1
pjtc
i
jt(ht 1; B) (9a)
di1t+1(ht 1; B) = (1 + rdt)d
i
2t(ht 1; B) + qj0ty (9b)
di2t(ht 1; S) = (1 + idt)d
i
1t(ht 1) + pj0ty (9c)
di1t+1(ht 1; S) = (1 + rdt)d
i
2t(ht 1; S) 
nX
j=1
qjtc
i
jt(ht 1; S) (9d)
It should be no surprise that these budget constraints are relabelled versions of the budget con-
straints in the enforceable debt problem. In order to make the enforcement of debt endogenous,
banks will have to impose credit limits on the amount of debt that the various types of agents can
borrow to ensure that over the innite horizon default is always more costly than repayment. Thus
there is an additional set of constraints:
dist(ht)  dist(ht) (10)
where dist(ht) is a non-positive number that constrains the debt of an agent of type i and history
ht in sub-period s of date t. The consumers intermediated credit problem is to choose cijt and d
i
st
to maximize the objective function, equation 4, subject to the budget constraints, equations 9a,
9b, 9c and 9d, and to the debt constraints dened in equation 10.
Denition 5 An intermediated credit equilibrium is an allocation of goods, fcijt(ht)g; and of
account balances, fdist(ht)g, and sequences of prices, fpjtg and fqjtg, of interest rates, fidtg and
frdtg, and of credit constraints, f dist(ht)g, such that
(i) given prices, interest rates and credit constraints, the consumers intermediated credit problem
is maximized for consumers of every type i and history, ht
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(ii) the goods markets clear, equation 5,
(iii) for all dist(ht)  dist(ht), a consumer of type i and history ht will choose to repay debt at date
t.
Observe that this problem has the same rst order conditions as the enforceable debt problem
with the caveat that all of these conditions may hold as inequalities in the present environment.
We wish to establish the circumstances in which a Pareto optimal allocation can be implemented in
an intermediated credit equilibrium. Since all accounts start with an initial value of zero, di10 = 0
for all i. Then Lemma 4 (which depends only on the budget constraints and the transversality
condition) tells us that the only Pareto optimal allocation consistent with the equilibrium is the
allocation in which no borrowing or saving takes place from one period to the next. This allows
us to focus on the special case in which banks permit no borrowing at the end of sub-period two or
by rst sub-period sellers in sub-period one. In other words we will assume that banks o¤er debt
contracts with the following constraints:
di1t+1(ht) = 0
di2t(ht 1; S) = 0
This assumption greatly simplies our exposition without imposing a binding constraint on our
agents given the equilibrium allocation we seek to obtain.
The Pareto optimal allocation that does not involve transfers of wealth has cijt(ht) =
y
n for all
j; t; ht and i = fj0; yg. Observe that the prices and interest rates consistent with a stationary
equilibrium that were found in lemmas 1 and 3 are equally as valid in this environment as in the
enforceable debt environment.
Denition 6 A pareto optimal price system is composed of sequences of prices, fpjtg and
fqjtg, and sequences of interest rates, fidtg and frdtg, such that:
(i) pjt = pt for all j; t
(ii) qjt = qt for all j; t
(iii) the real intra-temporal interest rate is zero, (1 + rdt)
pt
qt
= 1 for all t, and
(iv) the real inter-temporal interest rate compensates for holding an asset over time,
(1 + idt+1)
qt
pt+1
= 1 for all t.
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The parameter which remains to be determined in an intermediated credit equilibrium consistent
with our transfer-free Pareto optimal allocation is the vector of credit constraints, di2t(ht 1; B). The
following discussion will assume that our agent faces a pareto optimal price system.
Let V id be the continuation value of default for an agent of type i. This is just the utility an
agent gets from consuming nothing forever:
V id =
1
1  nu(0)
Let V ic be the continuation value of consuming the Pareto optimal allocation forever for an agent
of type i = fj0; yg:
V ic =
1
1  nu
y
n

An agent, who chooses to default at time T , will borrow as much as possible at T and due to the
concavity of the utility function will consume equal amounts of all goods at date T . Thus the
value of default to an agent of type i = (j0; y) is: nu(  dnpt ) + V
id where d is the credit constraint.
Her utility when she does not default is: nu
  y
n

+ V ic. Let d^it(; y) be the d at which
nu
y
n

+ V ic   nu( d
npt
)  V id  0 (11)
holds with equality. Since the left hand side of this equation is strictly increasing in d, for
any asset level that is greater than d^it(; y) an agent of type i will choose not to default in a
Pareto optimal equilibrium. In other words, d^it(; y) is the equilibrium credit constraint when the
equilibrium allocation is the transfer-free Pareto optimum. The properties of this credit constraint
are established in the following lemma:
Lemma 6 Given a transfer-free Pareto optimal allocation, the credit constraint, d^it(; y), for an
agent of type i = fj0; yg
(i) does not depend on an agents history,
(ii) is decreasing in an agents endowment level, y, where d^it(; y) <  pty for all i,
(iii) is decreasing in  and
(iv) in the limit as  ! 1, d^it(; y) =  1.
This result allows us to demonstrate, rst, that a Pareto optimum can be implemented by en-
forceable debt contracts in an intermediated credit equilibrium, and, second, that if  is su¢ ciently
high this Pareto optimal allocation can be implemented using a schedule of credit constraints that
does not distinguish between the di¤erent types of agents, i.
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Proposition 5 The transfer-free Pareto optimal allocation can be attained in an intermediated
credit equilibrium.
Proposition 6 For  > , the transfer-free Pareto optimal allocation can be implemented in an
intermediated credit equilibrium by a uniform debt contract.
Proof. By lemma 6 we know that maxy d^it(; y) = d^
i
t(; 1). Thus, a uniform debt contract
with di2t(ht 1) = d^it(; 1) will guarantee that no agent defaults.
The transfer-free Pareto optimal allocation can only be obtained, however, if the highest income
type can a¤ord to buy the allocation or if d^it(; 1)   ptk. From equation 11 we know that
d^it(; 1) =  ptk when
 =
u
 
k
n
  u   1n
u
 
k
n
  u(0)  
As d^it is decreasing in , we can conclude that whenever  > 
 our allocation can be implemented
in an intermediated credit equilibrium given the following uniform debt constraints for all i; t and
ht:
di2t(ht 1) = d^
i
t(; 1)
di1t+1(ht) = 0
di2t(ht 1; S) = 0
Because the banks communicate with each other and can force a defaulter into autarky forever,
they can o¤er every consumer contract terms such that he will choose not to default. If the
consumers are su¢ ciently patient, the banks can o¤er the same terms to every type and still
preclude default.
While the autarkic penalty to default that we impose may seem excessive, it is important to note
that the results above do not depend on the specic form of the penalty, but only on the existence
of a repeated one-period penalty. Thus, alterations to the model such as the introduction of at
money are unlikely to change the character of the results. When at money is added to the credit
model, an agent in default will be able to continue participating in trade. However, as long as the
value of using at money alone is less than the value of paying with credit as we might expect if
government policy is uniform across agents the loss of access to nancial markets will be su¢ cient
for a uniform contract to support a credit equilibrium with patient agents. When our environment
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is extended to include both assets, a parameter like the ination rate will not only reduce the value
of at money, but will at the same time reduce our consumerspropensity to default.6
The intermediated environment that we propose in this paper has several important properties:
First, unlike the at money economy, a Pareto optimum can be reached in the intermediated
environment without type-specic policies the elastic nature of credit makes it a better solution to
our monetary problem by allowing agents to choose how much they wish to borrow.7 Second, when
our agents are su¢ ciently patient a uniform credit constraint will not bind and the problem becomes
identical to the competitive problem with enforceable debt. In short, we model intermediaries as
agents who use the fact that they are perceived to be default-free to resolve the liquidity problem
in the economy and thereby make it possible for the economy to reach a rst-best allocation.
Finally, the Pareto optimal intermediated credit equilibrium can be viewed as a self-conrming
equilibrium. Because agents believe that the banks set the credit constraints correctly, they believe
that the banks borrowers will repay their loans and therefore that the banks will not default.
This equilibrium is fragile in the sense that, if the consumers in the economy stop believing in
the intermediated credit equilibrium, the equilibrium will no longer exist. This property of the
equilibrium is, however, realistic: when consumers lose faith in the viability of a banking system,
they withdraw deposits and a nancial crisis follows. In future work we hope to investigate this
property of our model further.
4 Conclusion
Because credit in our environment solves a liquidity problem, we nd that debt can be sustained
by nothing more than the threat of losing the right to borrow in the future. This result stands in
stark contrast to results of the existing literature on self-enforcing debt contracts see for example
Bulow and Rogo¤ (1989) and Kehoe and Levine (1993). The di¤erent results derive from di¤erent
assumptions. The existing literature assumes that spot markets work perfectly in the absence of
nancial intermediation, whereas we assume that liquidity constraints can a¤ect market outcomes
and that nancial intermediation is needed to make markets work. Because withdrawing credit in
6 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
7Williamson (1999, 2004) also nds that the benets of private money derive from its elasticity. Bullard and
Smith (2003) arrive at a similar result, but use the terminology of the real-bills doctrine. Sissoko (2007a) also makes
this point.
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our model is equivalent to imposing a liquidity constraint on an agent, it is a severe penalty that
is su¢ cient to support an equilibrium with debt.8
We have deliberately developed an extremely stark and simple model: our agents must use
a means of exchange to trade because they only value consumption when they have nothing to
trade. While this give us an tractable environment, it does so at a cost. Since our agents do not
value their own endowments, a social planner can construct a gift-giving equilibrium in which a
Pareto optimum is achieved by anonymous agents who simply give their endowments away.9 In
Sissoko (2007b) we develop an environment where our consumers get a small amount of utility
from consuming their endowments. While this is su¢ cient to rule out charitable equilibria, the
tractability of the model is somewhat reduced.
We argue in the introduction that this model is like the competitive model except that the role
of nancial intermediaries has been made explicit. Our reasoning is as follows: the trading friction
that we introduce can be inserted into many competitive models with a continuum of agents by (i)
dividing each period into two sub-periods and allowing goods to perish in each sub-period and (ii)
giving one half of the agents their endowments (or production opportunities) in the rst sub-period
and their preference for consumption in the second and half of the agents the reverse. Simple
application of the folk theorem implies that as the discount factor converges to one, agents will
choose to repay intra-period debt, and thus there will always be an endogenous debt equilibrium
that is equivalent to the competitive equilibrium of the initial model.
On the other hand, when this friction is introduced into a competitive model where agents are
only moderately patient, a uniform credit policy o¤ered by nancial intermediaries may restrict the
consumption of wealthy agents. If the penalty for default allows exclusion from credit markets for
only a nite number of periods, a uniform credit policy may instead allow for endogenous default.
In fact, as long as the default behavior of consumers is predictable, our banks can successfully
manage the risk involved. If consumer endowments are stochastic, realizations at the far end of the
distribution may lead to a regular pattern of default and generate a stationary default equilibrium.
In an endogenous default environment bank policy would have to adjust in particular banks will
either need to maintain capital reserves or use gains from the interest rate spread to o¤set losses.
8As noted above Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2005) also use the threat of future borrowing to support debt in
an environment with a liquidity problem and nd a result comparable to ours.
9This type of equilibrium is familiar to economists who work with other stark models of money such as Kiyotaki
and Wright (1989)s search model of money.
21
Another extension of the model would study the e¤ects of bank default. Relaxing the assump-
tion that bankers are default free will lead us to dene a reaction function for our consumers that
states how their beliefs about intermediaries are updated in the case of observed default. It is
possible that a single default will cause the whole system of intermediated credit to collapse or
that it will have no e¤ect whatsoever. From a historical perspective, this range of possibilities may
be appropriate when discussing nancial markets.
This paper presents an environment where the endogenous debt equilibrium is intermediated
by default free banks. While other institutional structures can underlie endogenous debt, the
traditional emphasis on the importance of condence in the banking system to monetary and
nancial stability motivates our approach. We hope that future research will indicate that the
elastic nature of credit gives it an advantage over at money that contributes to the resilience of
nancial markets even in the event of unanticipated default.
Appendices
A Proofs of Lemmas
Lemma 1 In any enforceable debt equilibrium at every date t, any pair of goods has the same price
in sub-period one: pjt = pt for all j and t, and in sub-period two: qjt = qt for all j and t
Proof. First observe that when cijt > 0, u
0(0) > u0(cijt). Thus equation 6a tells us that
if any good is not consumed, its price is greater than the price of any good that is consumed.
Assume that pj0t = minjfpjtg and there exists p|^t > pj0t. Then equation 6a indicates that
cij0t(ht 1; B) > c
i
|^t(ht 1; B) for all i; t; ht. This, however, produces a contradiction because it is
impossible that the markets for goods |^ and j0 both clear. Therefore we can conclude that pjt = pt
for all j and t. The demonstration that qjt = qt for all j and t follows the same logic.
Lemma 2 In any enforceable debt equilibrium at any date t, every agent of type i and history, ht,
consumes the same quantity of every good j: cijt(ht) = c
i
t(ht) for all i; j; t; ht.
Proof. Combining lemma 1 with equations 6a and 6b we nd that cijt(ht) = c
i
t(ht) for all
i; j; t; ht.
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Lemma 3 In a stationary enforceable debt equilibrium, the real interest rate at any date t from
sub-period one to sub-period two is zero, (1 + rt)
pt
qt
= 1 for all t, and the real interest rate from
date t to date t+ 1 compensates the lender for the time value of money, (1 + it+1)
qt
pt+1
= 1 for all
t.
Proof. When cijt(ht) = c
i
j for all j; t; ht, then 
i
2t(ht 1) =
pt
qt
i1t(ht 1) for all i; t; ht. Substitut-
ing out the multipliers in equations 6e and 6f , we nd:
2
qt
= (1 + it+1)

1 + rt+1
qt+1
+
1
pt+1

2
(1 + rt)pt
= (1 + it+1)

1 + rt+1
qt+1
+
1
pt+1

Then in a stationary enforceable debt equilibrium 1 + rt =
qt
pt
for all t and 1 + it+1 = 1
pt+1
qt
.
Lemma 6 Given a transfer-free Pareto optimal allocation, the credit constraint, d^it(; y), for an
agent of type i = fj0; yg
(i) does not depend on an agents history,
(ii) is decreasing in an agents endowment level, y, where d^it(; y) <  y for all i,
(iii) is decreasing in  and
(iv) in the limit as  ! 1, d^it(; y) =  1.
Proof. Inspection of equation 11 demonstrates (i).
To demonstrate (ii) rst assume that d^it(; y)   pty. Then nu
  y
n

+V ic nu(  d^npt ) V id < 0
and we have a contradiction.
Now rewrite equation 11 as follows:
u
y
n

  u(0)  (1  )u
 d
npt

The left hand side of this equation is increasing in y and thus d^it(; y) is decreasing in y.
To show (iii) rewrite equation 11 as follows:

1  

u
y
n

  u(0)

 u
 d
npt

  u
y
n

Since the left hand side of this equation is increasing in , d^it(; y) is decreasing in . In the limit
as  ! 1, 1  !1. Therefore, there is no nite value of d^it(; y) as  ! 1.
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B Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 In a Pareto optimal at money equilibrium
(i) pjt = pt for all j; t
(ii) qjt = qt for all j; t
(iii) qt = pt for all t and
(iv) pt+1 = pt for all t.
Proof. In a Pareto optimal equilibrium, positive quantities are consumed of every good, so
equation 8a holds with equality. Assume that pjt > pj0t. Then by equation 8a we know that rst
sub-period buyers consume more of good j0 than of good j; and the consumption allocation is not
Pareto optimal. Conclusion: in a Pareto optimal equilibrium, pjt = pt for all j; t. The proof that
qjt = qt for all j; t follows the same logic.
Dividing equations 8a and 8b by lagged versions of themselves, we nd:
qt+1
qt
=
i2t(ht 1)
i2t+1(ht)
for all i; t; ht
pt+1
pt
=
i1t(ht 1)
i1t+1(ht)
for all i; t; ht
Observe that according to equation 7c the non-negativity constraint on it(ht 1; B) implies that
Pareto optimal consumption is only possible if mit(ht 1) > 0 for all i; t; ht. Then equations 8e and
8f hold with equality. Furthermore according to equation 7a, t(ht 1; S) > 0: So, equation 8d
holds with equality.
Because i1t+1(ht) = 
t+1u0(ci)=qt+1 for all ht and i1t+1(ht) = 
t+1u0(ci)=pt+1 for all ht, equa-
tions 8e and 8f tell us that i2t(ht 1) = 
i
2t(ht 1) and equation 8c that qt  pt with equality when
t(ht 1; B) > 0.
When qt = pt, equation 8c also holds with equality, and we nd that qt = qt 1.
Assume that at date t, qt > pt and consumption is Pareto optimal. Then the budget constraints
tell us that mit+1(ht 1; S) > mit+1(ht 1; B) for all i and ht 1. If the equilibrium is Pareto optimal,
by lemma 5 we know that mit+1(ht 1; B)  npt+1ci. Then when the agent of type i whose history
at date t is ht = fht 1; Sg is a rst sub-period buyer at date t+1, he nds mit+1(ht 1; S) > npt+1ci
with the result that t+1(ht 1; S;B) > 0 and qt+1 = pt+1. Furthermore, the budget constraints tell
us that mit+2(ht 1; S;B) > mit+2(ht 1; B;B) for all i and ht 1. Then by iterating this argument
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we nd that this agent continues to carry extra cash into every period in the future and therefore
we can conclude that qt0 = pt0 for all t0 > t.
Conclusion qt = pt for all t and therefore qt+1 = qt for all t.
C Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4 A Pareto optimal allocation cannot be implemented in a at money equilibrium if
the government policy treats all consumers uniformly:
Given a Pareto optimal price sequence, fpt ; qt g1t=0, if mi0 = m0 and  it =  t for all i and t, then
the equilibrium allocation is not a Pareto optimum.
Proof. Assume a Pareto optimal allocation, a Pareto optimal price sequence, and mi0 = m0
and  it =  t for all i and t. First we will show that the only Pareto optimal allocation consistent
with the transversality condition is the allocation where ci = yn for all i = fj0; yg. Next we will
show that this allocation is not a at money equilibrium.
Combine the rst and second sub-period budget constraints for either rst sub-period sellers or
buyers (repressing the history notation) to nd:
mit = p

t 1(y   nci) +mit 1    t 1
= (y   nci)p0
t 1X
s=0
s +m0  
t 1X
s=0
 s
where the last equality is found by iteration. Impose the transversality condition on money (taking
into account the fact that pt = 
tp0) to nd:
lim inf
t!1
u0(ci)
p0
"
(y   nci)p0
t 1X
s=0
s +m0  
t 1X
s=0
 s
#
= 0 for all i
which in turn implies:
y   nci = 1  
p0
" 1X
s=0
 s  m0
#
for all i
Thus the uniformity of the government policy, implies that all agents have the same real savings at
every date t. But, market clearing implies that the only possible level of savings is therefore zero.
Since agents save nothing, we have only one candidate allocation for a Pareto optimal equilibrium,
ci = yn for all i = fj0; yg.
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Given ci = yn , every agent spends the whole of value of his endowment in every period and our
budget constraints tell us that
mit+1(ht) = m
i
t(ht 1)   it for all i; t; ht
In other words, each agents money holdings change only due to taxation. Since we have assumed
that there is a single monetary policy for all types of agents, this immediately implies that every
agent holds the same quantity of money at every date t. Combining this fact with lemma 1, we
nd that
mit(ht 1) =Mt = m0  
t 1X
s=0
 s  pt y for all i = fj; yg and t
Recall that the maximum value of y is k and consider the behavior of an agent of type i0 = fj; y0g
where y0 < k. This agent knows that at every date t, m0  
Pt 1
s=0  s  ptk > pt y0. Thus this
agent knows that if he chooses to carry mt+1 < m0  
Pt 1
s=0  s into the next period, he will still be
able to consume ci = y
0
n for all dates in the future. Then there is some " such that at date t he
can spend some of his excess money and consume cijt(ht) =
y+"
n for all j and c
i = y
0
n for all dates
greater than t. Since this allocation is both a¤ordable and preferred by an agent of type i0, the
allocation ci = yn for all i = fj; yg can not be an equilibrium allocation.
D Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5 The transfer-free Pareto optimal allocation can be attained in an intermediated
credit equilibrium.
Proof. The intermediated credit equilibrium is composed of the following for each agent of
type i = fj0; yg: cijt(ht) = yn for all i; j; t; ht, a pareto optimal price system and debt constraints
such that di2t(ht 1) = d^it(; y), and di1t+1(ht) = di2t(ht 1; S) = 0 for all i; t; ht.
(i) Since d^it(; y) <  pty, every agent can purchase the allocation. Lemmas 1 and 3 demonstrate
that this allocation is optimal given the pareto optimal price system. The budget constraints make
it clear that the only time an agent will go into debt is as a rst sub-period buyer in which case
di2t(ht 1; B) =  pty for all i; t. First sub-period sellers will choose to lend di2t(ht 1; S) = pty for
all i; t. All other asset positions are zero.
(ii) Markets clear for all Pareto optimal allocations.
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(iii) We demonstrated above that d^it(; y) precludes default and the other credit constraints preclude
both debt and default.
27
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